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I. INTRODUCTION
This year marks a respite from the frenetic pace of recent legislative
efforts in Florida to respond to the perceived problems in Florida's juvenile
justice system.' This survey briefly highlights the legislative changes. On

* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, Fort
Lauderdale, Florida. B.A., 1967, Colgate University; J.D., 1970, Boston College. Professor
Dale is a member of the Arizona, Florida, New Mexico, and New York Bars. The author
thanks Gregg Abaray, Elysse Rispoli, and Todd Thurlow for their assistance in the
preparation of this article. This article covers cases decided through June 30, 1995.
1. For a discussion of legislative changes from 1989 through 1994, see Michael J. Dale,
Juvenile Law: 1994 Survey of FloridaLaw, 19 NOVA L. REV. 139 (1994) [hereinafter 1994
Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1993 Leading Cases and Significant Developments

in FloridaLaw, 18 NOVA L. REV. 541 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Leading Cases]; Michael J.
Dale, Juvenile Law: 1992 Survey of FloridaLaw, 17 NOVA L. REV. 335 (1992) [hereinafter
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the other hand, the appellate courts remained active, continuing a longstanding process of correcting trial court excesses and blatant failures to
comply with the provisions of the juvenile code. Finally, the state supreme
court heard several cases on narrow issues of juvenile law, as well as one
significant case involving privacy and a minor's consensual sexual activity
and a second involving the liability of the Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services ("HRS") for negligent allocation of services to
dependent and delinquent children.
II. DELINQUENCY
A. Detention Issues
Previous survey articles in this law review have dealt with Florida's
changing approach to juvenile detention over the past fifteen years and have
studied the large number of recent appellate cases interpreting the detention
laws.' It is no different this year.
Chapter 39 of the Florida Statutes requires that an intake counselor
who receives custody of the child from a law enforcement agency review
the law enforcement report or probable cause affidavit to determine whether
detention of a child on delinquency charges is required.3 In doing so, the
counselor bases his or her decision on whether or not to hold the child in
secure or non-secure detention on an assessment of risk that the child will
not appear and/or will commit other offenses.4 The decision is premised
upon a risk assessment instrument ("RAI"), a procedure developed by the
Department of Juvenile Justice.5 The RAI is based upon statutory detention
guidelines including, most significantly, the charge against the child. Even
when the charge is not significant enough to securely detain the child, the
court still has discretion to securely detain the child if it finds clear and

1992 Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1991 Survey of Florida Law, 16 NOVA L.
REV. 333 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Survey]; Michael J. Dale, Juvenile Law: 1990 Survey of
Florida Law, 15 NOVA L. REV. 1169 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Survey]; Michael J. Dale,
Juvenile Law, 14 NOVA L. REV. 859 (1990) [hereinafter Juvenile Law]; Michael J. Dale,
Juvenile Law, 13 NOVA L. REV. 1159 (1989); see also THE FLORIDA BAR CONTINUING
LEGAL EDUCATION, FLORIDA JUVENILE LAW AND PRACrICE (4th ed. 1995).
2. 1994 Survey, supra note 1, at 150-51; 1993 Leading Cases, supra note 1, at 552-54;
1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 348-53.
3. FLA. STAT. § 39.044(1) (Supp. 1994).
4. See id. § 39.042(1).
5. See id. § 39.042(2)(b).
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convincing evidence that the minor is a clear and present danger to himself
or the community.
In T.L.W. v. Soud,7 the First District Court of Appeal was asked to
determine whether the trial court had properly applied its discretionary
standard to securely detain a child. After examining the facts, the appellate
court found that it did.8 In addition, the court held that a writ of habeas
corpus is a proper remedy for a minor held in secure detention, although
statutory language would appear to indicate otherwise.' However, the court
also held that rule 8.130 of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure
provides for trial court reconsideration of the issue through a motion for
rehearing. 0 The appellate court expressly held that in the future, a trial
court's reconsideration of a claim that secure detention is contrary to law
shall be required prior to filing a writ for habeas corpus in the appellate
court."
In S.A.M. v. Bessette,'2 a juvenile filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, alleging illegal detention in violation of chapter 39. The juvenile
was charged with two counts of grand theft and was detained for failure to
appear on at least two previous occasions.13 The statute provides that a
child may be held in secure detention if he or she meets the detention
admission criteria. 4 A child may be placed in secure detention even when
not provided under the RAI computation system."5 However, as noted
above, the court must state in writing clear and convincing reasons for such
placement. 6 In the S.A.M. case, the child did not meet the statutory
detention criteria because she was not charged with a crime articulated in
the statute as warranting detention. 7 The only basis for detention articulated by the court was the allegation that the child was in contempt of court

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. § 39.044(2).
645 So. 2d 1101 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 1106.
Id. at 1104. See also FLA. STAT. § 39.044(5)(a).
T.LW., 645 So. 2d at 1105 n.2.
Id.

12. 641 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
13. Id. at 949.
14. See generally FLA. STAT. § 39.044.
15. ldM
16. Id. § 39.044(2)(f, which states: "If the court orders a placement more restrictive
than indicated by the results of the risk assessment instrument, the court shall state, in
writing, clear and convincing reasons for such placement." Id.
17. S.A.M., 641 So. 2d at 949.
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for failure to appear.'8 Since the trial court failed to show grounds to
override the statute, the appellate court granted the writ and ordered the
discharge of the child.' 9
B. Trial Issues
Following the Supreme Court of the United State's 1967 decision in re
Gault,2" Florida provided each child with a statutory right to counsel.2 '
In Washington v. State,2 z the Third District Court of Appeal was faced with
the question of whether the trial court could hold a detention hearing
pursuant to rule 8.305(b) of the FloridaRules of Juvenile Procedure in the
absence of counsel for the child. In an ill-considered opinion, devoid of
statutory authority, the court held that counsel was not necessary.23
Relying solely upon rule 8.305(b)(1), the court held that, "the rule does not
entitle defendant to counsel at this early stage in the juvenile adjudicatory
process. A detention hearing is merely an informal, non-adversarial
proceeding to inform defendant of the right to counsel in future proceedings
and determine whether probable cause exists to further detain defendant."'24
The court's decision is incorrect for two reasons. First, it apparently
failed to consider the Florida statute governing a child's right to counsel in
delinquency proceedings. Section 39.041 of the Florida Statutes provides
that a child is entitled to representation by legal counsel "at all stages of any
proceedings under this part. 25 By "part," of course, the legislature meant
chapter 39 of the juvenile code. Furthermore, this section provides that the
lawyer representing the child shall provide counsel "at any time subsequent
to the child's arrest, including prior to a detention hearing while in secure

18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (recognizing the child's constitutional right to counsel, including
an attorney free of charge if indigent, right to notice, right to an opportunity to be heard, and
other protections in a juvenile delinquency case).
21. FLA. STAT. § 39.041 (1993).
22. 642 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
23. Id. at 63. It is interesting to note that the appellant appealed pro per for post
conviction relief pursuant to rule 3.850 of the FloridaRules of Criminal Procedurefrom a
conviction as an adult on the charges, although the defendant was sixteen at the time of the
arrest. "Pro per" is short for propria persona, which means "in one's own proper person."
BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 792 (6th ed. 1990). It is essentially the same as "pro se," or
representation without a lawyer.
24. Washington, 642 So. 2d at 63.
25. FLA. STAT. § 39.041.
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detention care. 26 The second fallacy in the court's reasoning is that the
detention hearing is, or ought to be, a serious adversary proceeding wherein
it is determined whether secure detention, in particular, is appropriate.
Detention away from home in a locked setting is a serious issue involving
a deprivation of liberty with due process ramifications and ought not be
cavalierly disregarded by the courts.27
Chapter 39 contains provisions for legal representation of the child, and
interim medical and mental health services to the youngster. It allows the
trial court to order psychological evaluations in delinquency cases and to
require treatment both for alleged and adjudicated delinquent children.2 8
However, the development of psychological evaluations on behalf of the
juvenile defendant by his or her lawyer in preparing a defense is separate
and distinct from the court's power to order services.
In H.A.W. v. State,29 the Public Defender's Office requested and paid
for a psychological evaluation of the child to aid in his defense. Apparently,
the evaluation was performed after the child admitted to the charges. The
evaluation was available to the defense before the dispositional hearing and
thus would have been available for use in arguing for various dispositional
alternatives. 0 The trial court ordered the defense counsel to release the
psychological evaluation to the HRS to aid in the child's treatment after
disposition. An appeal followed. The appellate court held that the
disclosure of information received from an expert retained to assist the
defendant's counsel in preparing a defense violated the child's attorney/client privilege.31 According to the appellate court, the fact that the
child had been adjudicated and sentenced before the court ordered the
release of the evaluation was irrelevant.32 The adjudication did not
constitute a waiver of the child's privilege under FloridaStatutes sections

26. IL § 39.041(1) (emphasis added).
27. Cf 1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 343. For a discussion of the severity of secure
detention in Florida, see Michael J. Dale & Carl Sanniti, Litigation as an Instrumentfor
Change in Juvenile Detention: A Case Study, 39 CRIME & DELINQ. 49 (1992). For a

comparison with other states that recognize a right to counsel during a detention hearing see
Baumer v. State, 777 S.W.2d 847 (Ark. 1989); In re Jesse P., 5 Cal. Rptr. 2d 321 (Ct. App.
1992); T.K. v. State, 190 S.E.2d 588 (Ga. Ct. App. 1972); People v. Giminez, 319 N.E.2d
570 (111. App. Ct. 1974); State ex reL M.C.H. v. Kinder, 317 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 1984).
28. See FLA. STAT. § 39.046(1)-(3) (Supp. 1994).
29. 652 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).

30. IU. at 949.
31. Id.
32. Id.
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90.502 and 90.503 which govern the attorney/client privilege in Florida.33
The court then quashed the order requiring counsel to provide the psychological evaluation to HRS.34
A difficult problem for the juvenile court is how to cope with a
delinquent child who has been determined incompetent to proceed with an
adjudicatory hearing because of his or her level of mental retardation. In
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. State,35 HRS appealed
from orders in four delinquency cases. In each case, the trial court found
the youngster incompetent, then ordered HRS to begin proceedings for
involuntary hospitalization and, if the child did not qualify, to place the
child in a long-term mental health treatment facility.36 In the interim, the
court ordered that the children be held by HRS. The trial court relied upon
FloridaStatutes section 916.13, which governs procedures for court ordered
involuntary commitment of adult defendants who are determined to be
incompetent to stand trial or be sentenced. However, the appellate court
found that the statute did not apply to juvenile delinquency proceedings,
basing its opinion upon the language of section 916.13, which speaks of
"defendants," "standing trial," "sentencing," and "criminal court." 37 The
appellate court recognized that rule 8.095 of the FloridaRules of Juvenile
Procedureis the only procedure that is expressly available for juveniles who
are incompetent to proceed in delinquency adjudicatory hearings. 38 The
appellate court found that the reference in the Florida Rules of Juvenile
Procedureis to section 394, known as the "Baker Act" proceeding which
provides for involuntarily commitment of the severely retarded but does not
involve "hospitalization."3 9
However, the court noted that the juvenile rule had been amended to
allow for non-delinquent treatment including hospitalization and its effective
date was January 26, 1995.40 Thus, while the appellate court ruled that
section 916.13 was inapplicable and the trial court lacked the power to order
the involuntary commitment of a child alleged to be delinquent, the trial
court was directed to proceed under the juvenile rules.4' Under the new

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id.
H.A.W., 652 So. 2d at 949.
655 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 228.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 228-29.
HRS v. State, 655 So. 2d at 229.
Id.
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rule, the court may now order treatment for a period of up to two years. 42
Thus, the court may now seek a section 393 and section 394 commitment.43
C. Adjudicatory Issues
In an important decision affecting juveniles, the Supreme Court of
Florida in B.B. v. State' was asked to answer the question of whether
Florida's constitutional provision governing privacy makes FloridaStatutes
section 794.05, governing unlawful carnal intercourse, unconstitutional as it
pertains to a minor's consensual sexual activity. The appellant was charged
under Florida Statutes section 794.05 and filed a motion to declare the
statute unconstitutional as violative of his right to privacy and to dismiss the
petition. The petition was granted and the State appealed. Specifically, the
court was asked to determine whether a minor who engages in unlawful
carnal intercourse with an unmarried minor can be adjudicated to have
committed a felony of the second degree in light of the minor's right to
privacy guaranteed by the FloridaConstitution.4 5 In an opinion by Justice
Wells, the court relied upon In re T.W., in which the Supreme Court of
Florida had recognized that the right of privacy in article I, section 23 of the
Florida Constitution extends to minors.46 The B.B. court held that the
minor had a legitimate expectation of privacy in carnal intercourse because
it is by express definition an intimate act.47 In order to hold the child
criminally accountable, the court said that a compelling state interest must
be found to overcome the right to privacy.48 It was conceded by the court
that Florida does have an obligation and a compelling interest in protecting
children from sexual activity before they have sufficiently matured to make
appropriate decisions.49 However, in a minor-minor situation, unlike an
adult-minor situation, the prevention of exploitation rationale is nonexistent.50 In the minor-minor situation, the statute, according to the court,
is used as a weapon to adjudicate a minor delinquent rather than as a shield

42. IM
43. Id
44.
45.
46.
47.

659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995).
I at 257.
Id. (citing In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1193 (Fla. 1989)).
Id. at 259.

48. IM
49. B.B., 659 So. 2d at 259.

50. Id
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to protect the minor. l The court therefore held the statute unconstitutional
as applied to the minor. 2
In B.H. v. State,53 the Supreme Court of Florida recently resolved a
conflict between the district courts of appeal over the constitutionality of the
juvenile escape statute.54 The First and Fifth District Courts of Appeal
were at odds over the constitutionality of section 39.061 of the juvenile
code, which is the statute governing escapes from juvenile facilities. In fact,
the more significant issue the court resolved dealt with the role that the
administrative agency, here HRS, could take in defining the elements of a
crime. 5 After the court analyzed both federal and state precedent, it found
that the power to create crimes and punishments rests solely in the
legislative branch. 6 Further, the court held that administrative agencies do
not have the authority to create a criminal statute or its equivalent, nor can
they prescribe the penalty.57 The court concluded that the statute violated
two constitutional doctrines: the non-delegation doctrine, in which the
legislature authorized the administrative agency to decide exactly for which
categories of juvenile incarceration escape would be a felony and the
vagueness doctrine, resulting from the failure of the legislature to articulate
in the statute the activity for which escape would constitute a felony.5"
The latter failure was a violation of the due process rights of the child. In
other words, the statute failed to give notice of the prohibited act.59
Despite having concluded that the statute was unconstitutional, under the
doctrine of statutory revival, the court applied the predecessor statute,
holding it constitutional, and upheld the adjudication of escape. 6' In his
dissenting opinion, Justice Kogan argued that once the current statute was
rendered unconstitutional, the appellate court lacked the authority to review
the prior statute because doing so violated the child's due process rights due
to the lack of notice of prohibited conduct and the denial of the child's
opportunity to defend against the revised statute.6

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 260.
Id.
645 So. 2d 987 (Fla. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2559 (1995).
Id. at 995.
Id. at 990.
Id. at 992.
Id. at 992-93.
B.H., 645 So. 2d at 994.
Id. at 994.
Id. at 995-96.
Id. at 997.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/6

8

Dale: Juvenile Law

Dale

1995]
D. DispositionalIssues

As noted in prior survey articles, chapter 39 contains a variety of
dispositional choices available to the juvenile court including restitution,
community control, and commitment to various facilities operated or
supervised by the Department of Juvenile Justice. 62 Proper use of Florida's
restitution statute arises regularly in appellate case law. 63 Defining the
limitations on the use of an order for restitution was recently before the
Supreme Court of Florida in C. W.v. State.64 The specific issue was
whether the grant of authority under the Florida juvenile code provision
governing restitution includes damage for pain and suffering. The appellants
pled no contest to charges of aggravated battery. The trial court placed the
appellants on community control and ordered them and their parents to pay
restitution, including services for a psychologist, dental surgeon, and
65
hospital, and then ordered payment for the victim's pain and suffering.
The court held that the language of the statute66 which referred to any
damage caused by the child's offense, by its plain language, should include
pain and suffering because such 67damages have long been recognized as
compensable damages in Florida.
However, ordering restitution is not without limitation under the Florida
statute. Thus, in K.M.G. v. State,68 a juvenile appealed a trial order
imposing $1500 in restitution to compensate a victim for damage to his car.
The appellant was not charged with the theft of the vehicle, but merely for
trespass in a conveyance.6 9 In other words, the appellant was simply riding
in the vehicle before the police attempted to stop the car. The appellant and
the driver both jumped out of the car at different points in time, and the
damage to the vehicle was caused by the resulting crash. After examining
the record, the court concluded that there was no evidence that the appellant
damaged the interior of the vehicle, that she encouraged the driver to

62. See FLA. STAT. § 39.054; 1994 Survey, supra note 1, at 153-56; 1993 Leading
Cases, supra note 1, at 555-58; 1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 358-61. Supervision of
delinquency services was transferred from HRS to the Department of Juvenile Justice on
October 1, 1994. See FLA. STAT. § 39.021.
63. See 1994 Survey, supra note 1, at 154-53; 1993 Leading Cases, supra note 1, at
556-57; 1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 358-59.
64. 655 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 1995).
65. Id. at 88.
66. See FLA. STAT. § 39.054(1)(f) (1993).
67. C.W., 655 So. 2d at 89.
68.
69.

652 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Id at 482.
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abandon the vehicle, that she was part of a joint venture under tort law, or
that there was a conspiracy, so as to hold the appellant vicariously liable.7"
The appellate court reversed the restitution award because the record did not
establish that the appellant was anything other than a passenger.7 '
In J.B. v. State,72 the issue was whether it was error to order restitution for lost wages attributable to the victims' attendance as witnesses at the
restitution hearing in a delinquency case. The First District Court of Appeal
held that it was not.73 The court concluded that strict construction must be
given to the juvenile restitution statute.74 There is no reference to lost
wages in the statute. Furthermore, the wages were not causally related to
the commission of the crime, but resulted from the witnesses' attendance at
the hearing. The court therefore reversed.75
Finally, in a technical holding, the Second District Court of Appeal, in
C.B. v. State,76 reversed a restitution order where the trial court neither
ordered restitution nor reserved jurisdiction to do so at the time of the
dispositional order. After the child pled guilty to the commission of a
battery, the trial court withheld adjudication and ordered the child to enter
and complete juvenile arbitration. The court did not order restitution or
reserve jurisdiction to do so. Four months later, the court held the
restitution hearing and assessed $127.47 in restitution.77 On appeal, the
court held that once the trial court entered its order at the jurisdictional
stage, it lacked jurisdiction to enter an order of restitution."
One dispositional alternative which is not available to the juvenile court
is to order deportation. Incredibly, one trial court in Collier County tried to
do so. In LH. v. State,79 the Second District Court of Appeal quickly
reversed the finding that while the trial court was permitted to recommend
deportation to the federal authorities, it did not have authority to order the
deportation. °
A recurring problem with juvenile dispositional rulings is the trial
courts' disregard of the requirement to provide specific written findings for

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id.
Id.
646 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 809.
Id.
Id.
647 So. 2d. 964 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 964.
Id. at 965.
656 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 622.
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the imposition of an adult sentence, rather than a juvenile sentence as
provided by Florida Statutes section 39.059(7)(d)."' The leading case in
this area is Troutman v. State. 2 In Troutman, a juvenile pled nolo
contendere to charges of false imprisonment and grand theft. The trial court
found the sanction recommended in the predisposition report inadequate, and
decided to treat the juvenile as an adult.8 3 The court filed a conclusory
written order explaining the rationale for the child's sentence of three years
probation, three days after the sentencing occurred. 4 The Supreme Court
of Florida reversed and held'that the imposition of adult sanctions must be
considered by analyzing the specific circumstances in the case with the
statutory criteria before determination of the disposition. 5 Furthermore,
the court was required to provide an individualized evaluation of how the
juvenile fits within the enumerated statutory criteria contemporaneously with
the sentencing.86 Despite the clear statutory provision and the Troutman
decision, appellate courts continue to remand cases to the trial courts to
rectify their failure to provide the required written findings when sentencing
juveniles as adults. 7 This subject also has been regularly reviewed in prior
88
surveys.
The problem continued this past year for cases still in the "pipeline,"
as noted by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in Shaw v. State.89
However, by statute which became effective on October 1, 1994, the
legislature gave in, apparently recognizing either the unwillingness or
inability of the trial courts to carry out the law, and relieved the courts of
the burden of making written findings.9" The new section 39.059(7)(d)
provides that a decision to impose adult sanctions must be in writing, but is
81. FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d) (Supp. 1994).
82. 630 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 1993).
83. Il at 530.
84. Id
85. Id at 531.
86. Id. at 532.
87. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 657 So. 2d 23 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Pearson v.
State, 657 So. 2d 21 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Walker v. State, 656 So. 2d 950 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Knight v. State, 656 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Philmore
v. State, 656 So. 2d 270 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Gammage v. State, 655 So. 2d 183
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Wood v. State, 655 So. 2d 1155 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1995); Crain v. State, 653 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Satalino v. State, 652
So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995); Sales v. State, 652 So. 513 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1995).
88. See 1994 Survey, supra note 1, at 155-56.
89. 645 So. 2d 68 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
90. See FLA. STAT. § 39.059(7)(d).
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presumed appropriate.9" The court is not required to state specific findings
or enumerate the criteria as a basis for its decision to impose adult sanctions
on a juvenile.9 2 The legislature's decision is unfortunate because it makes
the appellate court's obligation to determine whether the child's transfer was
appropriate more difficult. Now, the appellate court must look at the record
on appeal to determine the trial court's rationale. Were the trial court
simply to render a written opinion articulating its grounds, summary
appellate affirmance would be easier. Furthermore, the legislature's
capitulation is harmful to children because it may make the process of
transfer to adult court easier in cases where there may be counter-vailing
considerations which are now more difficult and time-consuming for defense
counsel to present on appeal. Finally, and most discouraging, the change in
the law demonstrates that the legislature recognized the seeming incapacity
of the trial courts to do what judges are usually thought competent to do make thoughtful written findings.
Like restitution, the proper use of community control is a recurring
issue of appellate review in Florida.93 Community control is Florida's term
for probation, and the trial court has great discretion in the choice of devices
available to correct juvenile behavior. 94 In re D.S., 9' the Fourth District
Court of Appeal upheld an order requiring the child not to associate with
gang members as a condition of community control. However, the court
specified that any violation of probation must be supported by a showing
that the child knew that the individuals with whom he was associated were
gang members.9 6 In B.B. v. State,97 the same appellate court was faced
with the question of whether the requirement that a child obtain a General
91. Id.
92. Id. § 39.059(7)(d) states: "Any decision to impose adult sanctions must be in
writing, but is presumed appropriate, and the court is not required to set forth specific
findings or enumerate the criteria in this subsection as any basis for its decision to impose
adult sanctions." Id.
93. See 1994 Survey, supra note 1, at 157-58; 1993 Leading Cases, supranote 1, at 5556; 1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 358-59; 1991 Survey, supra note 1, at 349-52; see also
M.B. v. State, 655 So. 2d 1301 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a sentence to
community control for an indefinite period must be reversed because it exceeds the maximum
sentence that can be imposed for the charge - a first degree misdemeanor).
94. See In re S.C., 645 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994). The trial court
placed conditions that the child must obtain a psychological evaluation, have a set curfew,
attend school every day, and perform fifty hours of community service, which could be
worked off by attending counseling. Id.
95. 652 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
96. Id. at 892-93.
97. 647 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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Equivalency Diploma ("G.E.D.") within one year, as a provision of
community control, together with fifty hours of community service, an
apology to the victim, and payment of $50 to the Florida Crime Compensation Fund, was unreasonable because it was unrelated to rehabilitation and
further, because the child could not comply within the time allowed.98 The
court held that the legislature recognized the correlation between delinquency and lack of education and gave the trial court the power to require
enrollment in school or other educational programs as a rehabilitative
component of community control.99
Another element of the dispositional stage of a delinquency case in
Florida involves payment of court costs. In J.L. v. State,"° the child
appealed from a finding of delinquency and an order to pay restitution and
court costs. Relying on a 1994 district court of appeal opinion, in J.A. v.
State,"01 the Second District Court of Appeal held that court costs may not
be assessed because the child's adjudication was withheld. 1"
As part of its 1994 legislative effort to become tougher on juveniles,
the Florida Legislature changed its juvenile code in the dispositional area to
include the use of detention as a dispositional alternative in limited cases.
As a punishment alternative, a minor may serve a five-day mandatory period
of detention in a secure detention facility and perform 100 hours of
community service for a first offense that involves the use or possession of
a firearm. 0 3 In State v. R.F.,' °4 an appeal involving a particularly narrow question, the Third District Court of Appeal held that the term "day"
refers to a twenty-four hour period of time and not an "eight" hour work
day as interpreted by the trial court when it rendered the dispositional
order."05 The appellate court did note, however, that the trial court had
discretion to decide how the mandatory term was to be served."° The
court explained that where the youngster is in school or working, the trial
court may require the term be served on weekends."°
Under Florida law, a juvenile charged as a delinquent may not be
sentenced as an adult. Florida law provides that after a child has been
98.

Id. at 269.

99. 1&at 270 (citing
100.
101.
102.

103.
104.

FLA. STAT.

§ 39.053(2) (1993)).

650 So. 2d 219 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
633 So. 2d 108 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
J.L, 650 So. 2d at 220.
See FLA. STAT. § 790.22(9)(a).
648 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).

105. Id. at 294.
106. Id.
107. Id.
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transferred by demand of the child, a voluntary or involuntary waiver
hearing, based on a criminal information, or indictment, and has been
convicted for the offense underlying the transfer, the child must be handled
in every respect as if he or she were an adult "for any subsequent violation
of state law" unless, as discussed above, the court imposes juvenile
sanctions. In T.L.P. v. State,"°8 a juvenile admitted to the charges of battery, criminal mischief, and violation of community control, and was
adjudicated delinquent. Upon discovering that the juvenile was previously
sentenced to four years in prison on an unrelated offense for which he was
tried as an adult, the trial court sentenced the child to one year in county jail
for each offense." 9 The appellate court held that since the juvenile
offenses were committed before the child was convicted of the offense for
which he was tried as an adult, the juvenile offenses were not subsequent
violations under Florida law."' In order for a child to be subjected to
adult penalties, the youngster must be charged as an adult by information or
pursuant to a waiver hearing."' If the child has been adjudicated delinquent, the dispositional alternatives do not include incarceration in an adult
12
facility.
The Second District Court of Appeal addressed virtually the same issue
1 3 In Kazakoff, all parties
in an en banc review in Kazakoff v. State."
involved in the sentencing believed that the juvenile's prior treatment as an
adult obviated the need to comply with the provisions of chapter 39
governing adult sentencing. In this case, as in T.L.P., the offense for which
the child was charged as a juvenile occurred before the commission of the
offenses for which he was charged as an adult.'14 Thus, the offenses at
issue in Kazakoff did not constitute subsequent violations of the law
subjecting the child to adult sentencing." 5 A second issue before the
court in Kazakoff was the proper application of Florida's transfer for adult
prosecution statute." 6 The child claimed that the transfer order failed to
contain any findings of fact with regard to two of the mandatory statutory

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
So. 2d 51
114.
115.
116.

657 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 49.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 49 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.022(5)(d) (1993)).
Id.
642 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); see also Thomas v. State, 657
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (following Kazakoff).
Kazakoff, 642 So. 2d at 598.
Id. at 597.
Id.
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transfer criteria found in section 39.052(2)(c) and 39.052(2)(e)." 7 The
district court of appeal recognized that there was a prior conflict in the
appellate case law surrounding the effect of the trial court's failure to make
the required statutory findings in the waiver order.118 The appellate court
chose to side with those courts that do not treat the deficiency as invalidating the juvenile's subsequent conviction as an adult, but rather require
reversal and remand for the more limited purpose of entry of a proper order
while leaving the conviction intact.119
E. Appellate Issues
Questions of what constitutes an appealable order in delinquency cases
have come before the Florida courts on a number of occasions. 2 In State
v. Del Rey,"' the State filed a consolidated petition for writ of certiorari
and appealed, seeking review of a non-final order of the juvenile court. The
trial court waived jurisdiction over the child to adult criminal court, but first
reduced three filed charges and precluded the state from filing an information charging the child as an adult for an offense other than those on which
the court waived jurisdiction." The appellate court dismissed the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction finding there was no supreme court rule of procedure
which authorizes the state to appeal from a non-final order in a juvenile
delinquency case."z The court concluded that the Florida Constitution
allows interlocutory appeals only to the extent provided by the Supreme
Court of Florida rules." 4 Case law indicates that the Florida Rules of
Appellate Procedure which allow non-final orders to be appealed do not
apply in delinquency cases."z The court dismissed the petition for a writ
of certiorari and held that certiorari lies only where the order to be reviewed
may cause significant injury in subsequent proceedings in which the remedy
by appeal will be inadequate.1 26 The court concluded that the State had

117. Id. at 598.
118.

Id. at 599.

119. Kazakoff, 642 So. 2d at 599-600.
120. See 1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 554-55; 1993 Leading Cases, supra note 1, at
364-65.
121. 643 So. 2d 1146 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
122.

Id. at 1147.

123.

Id.

124. Id.
125. Id. (citing State v. M.G., 550 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.), review
denied, 551 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1989)).
126. Del Rey, 643 So. 2d at 1148.
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since charged the youngster in an information which was the subject of
subsequent litigation. 7 The circuit court had not yet ruled on a motion
by the child challenging the information. 28 If the court were to allow the
information, the matter would be moot. If the motion were denied, it would
be immediately appealable because, even though it is a final order, it is one
dismissing the count of an information.' 29 For these reasons the appeal
and the certiorari petition were dismissed. 30
F. Legislation
As noted, the Florida Legislature did not concentrate its efforts in the
area of juvenile law this year. However, in an attempt to address the
growing concern about juvenile sexual offenders, the legislature established
After the adjudicatory hearing stage,
a juvenile sexual offender statute.'
the court may determine whether placement in a juvenile detention facility
32
is in the best interest of the juvenile sexual offender and the public.
The court may require an examination of the juvenile by a psychologist,
therapist, or psychiatrist, and have that person submit a report with a
proposed plan of treatment for the child.'33 Accordingly, juvenile sexual
offenders may, at the court's discretion, be ordered to community-based34
treatment as opposed to proceeding with a standard disposition hearing.'
Once a juvenile is adjudicated a sexual offender, the court may, subject
to funding, commit the juvenile to the Department of Juvenile Justice for
placement in a sexual offender facility or program. 35 At this point, the
juvenile sexual offender is committed for an indefinite period of time until

127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. For a definition of juvenile sexual offender, see ch. 95-267, § 43, 1995 Fla. Sess.
Law Serv. 1833, 1866 (West) (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 39.01(76)); see also, id. § 49,
1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1871 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 415.50165(7)).
132. Id. § 45, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1868 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
39.052(6)).
133. Id.
134. See id. § 45, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1868-69 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
39.052(6)).
135. Ch. 95-267, § 46, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1869-70 (to be codified at FLA.
STAT. § 39.054(1)(j)). See generally id. §§ 52-53, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1874 (to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 415.504) (adding duties of the Task Force on Juvenile Sexual
Offenders and the Victims of Juvenile Sexual Abuse and Crimes, and establishing criteria for
mental health counselors).
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the treatment program is completed, but treatment may not exceed the length
of time an adult would serve for the same offense. 3 6 Also subject to
appropriation, the treatment program must provide educational and
psychological services to the juvenile, extending to aftercare counseling and
monitoring upon release.137 Once a juvenile sexual offender is placed in
detention, the detention staff must provide adequate supervision to the other
children in the facility, as well as notify school personnel and law enforcement agencies of the sexual offender's release from detention.'38
The legislation' also authorized the Department of Juvenile Justice to
create secure juvenile assignment centers for committed youths who are, at
a minimum, a moderate risk level.'39 The centers will house youths after
the dispositional hearing pending placement in a residential commitment
program."
At the centers the children will receive medical, academic,
mental health, psychological, behavioral, sociological, substance abuse, and
vocational testing.' The centers will determine the children's treatment
needs and develop necessary treatment plans. 42 While staying at the
center, the child shall be entitled to numerous short-term services, including
educational, vocational, physical and mental health, substance abuse
education, anger and impulse management training, and conflict resolution
training. 43 The centers' staff will place the child in a commitment
program based on the court ordered restrictiveness level, the evaluation by
the centers' staff, and the geographic location of the child's family so that
the family can participate in the rehabilitation."

136. Id. §§ 52-53, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1874 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
415.504).
137. See id. § 48, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1870 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §

39.0571).
138. Id. § 44, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1868 (to be codified at

FLA. STAT. §

39.044(1 1)(a)-(b)).

139. Ch. 95-267, § 41, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1866 (to be codified at FLA.
§ 39.0551).

STAT.

140. Id.
141. Id.

142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Ch. 95-267, § 41, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1866 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 39.0551).
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III. DEPENDENCY AND TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS
A. Adjudicatory Issues
Dependency proceedings are often used as tactical devices in what are
essentially divorce and custody disputes. 41 Clock v. Clock'46 is such a
case. A stepmother filed a petition for dependency in an effort to stop the
planned relocation of her stepson with the child's natural father from Florida
to Colorado. The petition was brought because the child wanted to stay in
Florida with the stepmother from whom the father had been divorced after
nine years of marriage. The child remained with the stepmother after the
divorce until the end of the school year when the father planned to move
back to Colorado with the child. The petition alleged, among other things,
that the father abandoned the child in Monroe County, Florida and that the
child was in risk of neglect, abuse, or abandonment if he returned to
Colorado with his father. 47 Finally, the petition alleged that the child did
not wish to relocate to Colorado. 48 After hearing testimony, the trial
court granted the petition for dependency despite an earlier finding that no
149
abuse, neglect, or abandonment by the natural parents occurred.
Ultimately, the trial court returned the child to the custody of his father, but
enjoined the father from relocating the child outside of Monroe County,
except for summer vacations. 150 The natural parents (the mother residing
in Colorado) appealed on the ground that the record did not support a
finding of dependency. The appellate court held that the legislature never
intended the dependency statute to subject an otherwise fit custodial parent
to a charge simply because the parent sought to relocate the child against the
child's wishes. 5' Thus, the court held that merely "relocating or separating a child from familiar surroundings by an otherwise fit and proper
is not abuse under the dependencustodial parent against the child's wishes"
52
code.
juvenile
Florida's
of
cy provisions
Under Florida law, when a court makes a dependency finding it must
prepare written findings of fact to support the order.'53 If a court fails to

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

See 1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 369.
649 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
Id. at 313.
Id.
Id. at 313-14.
Id. at 314.
Clock, 649 So. 2d at 314-15.
Id. at 315 (citing FLA. STAT. § 39.01(2), (10)(a) (1993)).
See FLA. STAT. § 39.409 (1993); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.330(g).
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do so, the case must be remanded for written findings of fact, as the court
held in Ash v. Departmentof Health & Rehabilitative Services. 4 Further,
as noted by the Ash court, written findings of fact are not rendered valid by
the filing of a notice of appeal if they are written after jurisdiction has been
lost. 155
B. Child Abuse Registry Reporting Issues
Florida's child abuse and neglect reporting statute contains provisions
for a central abuse registry and tracking system and due process controls to
protect alleged perpetrators. 5 6 Child abuse reporting systems, including
Florida's system, have generated substantial litigation. Cases involving
implementation of the reporting system continue to regularly come before
Florida's appellate courts. 7 In addition, a number of civil rights cases
have been brought throughout the country challenging reporting sys58
tems.1
In S.G. v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services,'59 an
appellant sought to have her name expunged from Florida's central child
abuse registry and tracking system, causing a statutorily mandated administrative review process to ensue. At an administrative hearing, HRS
introduced into evidence a dependency order entered by the circuit court in
a parallel proceeding, but failed to argue collateral estoppel or res judicata.
The hearing officer found that HRS did not satisfy its statutory burden of
proof and recommended expunction. HRS rejected the officer's findings
and the appeal followed." 6 The appellate court found, inter alia, that the
agency incorrectly relied on a non-final dependency order which was the
subject of a pending appeal.16 1 In fact, two weeks after the agency's entry
of its final order, the Third District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded
the dependency order.
Incredibly, HRS declined to file a brief in S.G.,
with the result of "leaving [the court] without any insight into the agency's

154. 649 So. 2d 305, 306 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
155. Id.
156. See FLA. STAT. § 415.504(4) (Supp. 1994).
157. For a discussion of cases decided in earlier years, see 1993 Leading Cases,supra
note 1, at 551-52; 1991 Survey, supra note 1, at 366-68.
158. See, e.g., Doe v. Louisiana, 2 F.3d 1412 (5th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.
Ct. 1189 (1994); Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1993).
159. 647 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
160. Id. at 243.
161. Id. at 243-44.
162. Id. at 244.
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present legal position." 63 The appellate court reversed and directed HRS
to "enter an order consonant with the conclusions of law reached by the
hearing officer."' 64
The constitutionality of the definitional language of the child abuse
reporting statute came before the Supreme Court of Florida this past year in
Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. A.S. 165 A single father
sought to have his name removed from the HRS central abuse registry
having been cited for neglect for leaving his six-year old son home alone for
at least six hours. The father, a fish and wildlife officer, elected to take part
in a stakeout to apprehend a suspect despite having no arrangements for
child care. A report was made to HRS and the father was cited. The father
challenged the statutory provision which provides that harm to a child's
health or welfare can occur based upon the failure to provide "'the child
with supervision or guardianship by specific acts or omissions of a serious
' 66
nature requiring the intervention of the department or the court.""
The supreme court found that the legislature could not define with
complete specificity all acts or omissions which are serious enough to fall
within the act.' 67 According to the court, whether a particular act is
covered must be determined on a case-by-case basis. 6 However, the
court concluded that the definition provides sufficient standards to be
followed by HRS in carrying out its responsibility. 69 Finally, the court
held that the standards to be followed relate to the governmental purpose if
the goal is the prevention of harm to neglected children. 70 Although the
court upheld the statute as constitutional, it concluded that it was inapplicable to the case at hand because the conduct of the father did not rise to the
level where he should be classified as a perpetrator of child neglect.'
C. Termination of Parental Rights Issues
Florida's juvenile code contains four distinct grounds for termination
of parental rights:

163.

Id.

164. S.G., 647 So. 2d at 244.
165.
166.

648 So. 2d 128 (Fla. 1995).
Id. at 129 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 415.503(9)(e) (Supp. 1990), amended by FLA.
STAT. § 415.503(1O)(e) (Supp. 1994)).
167. Id. at 131.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. A.S., 648 So. 2d at 131.
171. Id.
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1) voluntary execution of a written surrender of the child; 2) the

inability to identify or ascertain the location of a parent by diligent
search; 3) egregious conduct by the parent that endangers the life,
health, or safety of the child or the child's sibling; or 4) when the child
has been adjudicated dependent, a case plan has been filed with the
child continues to be abused, neglected, or abandoned by
court, and the
72
the parent.1

In a September 1994 opinion, the Supreme Court of Florida in re T.M., 73
was presented with the question of whether a termination of parental rights
case could go forward in a situation where there had been no provision for
a performance agreement or permanent placement plan with the parent prior
to the termination. Under the 1990 version of the termination statute, a
performance agreement or permanent placement plan need not have been
made available under section 39.464 in the situation of severe or continuing
abuse or neglect and egregious abuse.174 In T.M., the father, whose
parental rights had been terminated in the lower court, argued on appeal that
sections 39.464(3) and (4) conflicted with section 39.467, which articulated
the procedure for an adjudicatory hearing in termination of parental rights
cases. 75 Section 39.467 required proof that either a performance agreement or permanent placement plan had been offered to the parent or that any
of the elements of section 39.464 were met, and that the parent offered the
agreement or plan has failed to substantially comply with it. 76 The
Supreme Court of Florida held that the two sections of the law were not
inconsistent.1 77 Section 39.467 should be read in the disjunctive, and,
take place and be satisfied without offering a
therefore, termination could
7
1
agreement.
performance
The appellant father also argued that termination of parental rights
without a plan or an agreement violated his constitutional right to family
integrity as articulated by the supreme court in Padgett v. Department of
Health & Rehabilitative Services.1 7 9 The supreme court held that performance agreements or permanent placement plans are not required in all

172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
565, 571

§ 39.464.
641 So. 2d 410 (Fla. 1994).
FLA. STAT. § 39.464(3)-(4) (1990).
T.M., 641 So. 2d at 411.
Id.
Id. at 412.
Id.
Id. (citing Padgett v. Department of Health & Rehabilitative Servs., 577 So. 2d
(Fla. 1991)); see also 1991 Survey, supra note 1, at 368-73.
FLA. STAT.
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instances and that the Padgett court used the term "ordinarily" to indicate
that there might be exceptions."' 0 This case is one of them.
As the listing above shows, one of the grounds for termination of
parental rights is a voluntarily executed written surrender of the child, giving
the youngster to HRS or to a licensed child-placing agency for subsequent
adoption. 81 In any termination situation, there must be proof that the
termination is in the manifest best interests of the child and that certain
notice requirements have been met.182 In Henriquez v. Adoption Centre,
Inc., 83 the Fifth District Court of Appeal was asked to revisit the issue of
the grounds for revocation of the voluntary surrender. The case concerned
a mother's appeal from a trial court decision terminating her parental rights
when she voluntarily surrendered her nine-month old child to the adoption
center, but when five days after doing so, she withdrew her waiver and
consent and sought to have her child returned. The mother claimed at trial
that termination was improper because the Florida statute governing
termination was unconstitutional. She argued that it did not provide for a
cooling-off period for parents who voluntarily execute a written surrender
of the child. The mother argued further that she had surrendered her child
under duress. On motion for rehearing en banc, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal held that the supreme court previously upheld the constitutionality
of the statute on due process and equal protection grounds in re Adoption
of Doe.'84 The court held that the failure to provide a cooling-off period
can only be remedied by the legislature. 8 5 The court also held that clear
and convincing evidence
showed that the surrender had been freely and
186
voluntarily executed.
In a lengthy dissent, Chief Judge Harris argued that there was no
finding that termination was in the best interests of the child pursuant to the
then applicable statute.'87 Chief Judge Harris's second argument was that
In re Adoption of Doe did not consider a constitutional challenge to the

180. T.M., 641 So. 2d at 413.
181. FLA. STAT. § 39.464(1)(a) (Supp. 1994).
182. Id. §§ 39.4611(1)(c), 39.462.
183. 641 So. 2d 84 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993), review denied, 649 So. 2d 233
(Fla. 1994).
184. Id. at 89 (citing In re Adoption of Doe, 543 So. 2d 741 (Fla. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 964 (1989)).
185. Id. at 89-90.
186. Id. at 90.
187. Id. at 96 (Harris, C.J., dissenting); see FLA. STAT. § 39.467 (1991). See also
id. §§ 39.4611-39.4612 (Supp. 1994) (reflecting the necessity of considering the manifest
best interests of the child in termination of parental rights cases).
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consent provision based upon the mother's fundamental liberty interest in
the care, custody, and management of her child.188 The chief judge argued
that the state should not be allowed to terminate parental rights "by barring
parents from changing their minds (even after a waiver and consent is
properly executed) when the change of mind occurs before the petitionfor
termination is even filed and before the rights of any potential adoptive
parents come into existence[.]"' 89 In his view, the statute ensures quick
and efficient resolution and disposal of such cases, but denying the mother
the right to make a case that she is a fit and deserving mother who is able
and willing to continue to care for the child "is both unfair and unreasonable. , ,190
The question of who has standing to bring a termination of parental
rights proceeding has been before the Florida appellate courts on a number
of occasions.' 9' Whether allowing a guardian ad litem to petition for
termination of parental rights violates the separation of powers clause of the
FloridaConstitution was an issue considered by the Third District Court of
Appeal recently in Simms v. State.'92 The court held in an en banc
decision that there was no violation of the separation of powers doctrine. 93 The court ruled that the power to protect the welfare of children
and terminate parental rights was not an exclusive power of one branch of
government and, therefore, not subject to the separation of powers
clause.'94 The court found that there was power to protect children both
in the executive and in the judicial branch. The authority of the courts to
protect children was inherent and, according to the appellate court, extended
to the appointment of guardians ad litem for unrepresented children.9
This authority was codified by the Florida Legislature in 1975.196 At the
same time, the legislature created HRS and charged it with the protection of
dependent children. 9 7 Thus, the court could find no language in the
FloridaConstitution nor historical precedent confining the power to a single

188.

Henriquez, 641 So. 2d at 98-99 (Harris, C.J., dissenting).

189. Id. at 99.
190. Id. at 101.
191. See 1993 Leading Cases, supra note 1, at 544-46; 1990 Survey, supra note 1, at
1201.
192. 641 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994), review denied, 649 So. 2d 870
(Fla. 1994).
193. Id. at 962.
194. Id. at 961.
195. Id.
196. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 415.508 (1991)).
197. Simms, 641 So. 2d at 961.
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branch of government. Rather, it found that section 39.464 provides concurrent authority in HRS, guardians ad litem, and licensed child-placing
agencies to file petitions to terminate parental rights. 98 Finally, the court
concluded that there are situations where the best interests of the child and
HRS's interests may differ.199 Therefore, providing authority in both
branches of government furthers the State's interest in protecting children. 2 0
Chief Judge Schwartz dissented, arguing that it was a violation of due
process, in the context of the right to a fair trial, to permit the judiciary's
appointee, in the form of a guardian ad litem, to prosecute an action to
deprive a parent of the precious right to her child.20' In his view, it is
"profoundly wrong for any entity but the executive to seek and advocate the
deprivation of another's rights."20 2 Chief Judge Schwartz also noted that
the problem may have been rectified in 1994 by the legislature's change in
section 61.403,2o3 which now provides that "[a] guardian ad litem when
appointed shall act as next friend of the child, investigator or evaluator, not
as attorney or advocate but shall act in the child's best interest. '2°4
However, section 61.403 also provides that the guardian ad litem,
acting through counsel, may file pleadings for relief as the guardian deems
appropriate in furtherance of the guardian's function.20 5 Thus, whether the
guardian ad litem either individually or through counsel can file petitions to
terminate parental rights remains open to interpretation. If Chief Judge
Schwartz is correct, the child is left at the mercy of HRS to protect his or
her interests for filing purposes. An alternative approach, which Florida has
never followed, is to provide the right to counsel for a child in a dependency proceeding which would then allow for protection at the termination
stage. °6
Termination of the parental rights of parents who are in prison is a
common issue both in the appellate courts of Florida2 7 and throughout the

198. Id.
199. Id. at 962.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 963 (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting).
202. Simms, 641 So. 2d at 963 (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting).
203. Id. at 963 n.1.
204. FLA. STAT. § 61.403 (emphasis added).
205. Id. § 61.403(6).
206. See Juvenile Law, supra note 1, at 888; see also MARK I. SOLER ET AL.,
REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT 4-52 to 4-55 (Matthew Bender, 1994).
207. See, e.g., In re E.F., 639 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1994); In re C.M.,
632 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
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country.'
In re G.R.S.,2 9 a natural father appealed from an order
terminating parental rights for abandonment and failure to comply with a
performance agreement. The father had consented to dependency of the
child and entered into a performance agreement with the goal of reunification.21 At the time, the father was in prison. The agreement obligated
him to comply with rules of the prison, participate in drug programs and
parenting classes, obtain adequate housing upon release, obtain a psychological evaluation and, if necessary, therapy, and maintain biweekly contact
with HRS.2 The appellate court overturned the trial court's fact-finding,
concluding that "[t]he record reflect[ed] that [the father] substantially
performed all of the tasks that were offered in prison, but could not perform
certain tasks because they were not available to him." ' Furthermore, the
trial record was "devoid of any evidence of reasonable efforts by HRS to
reunify the family, communicate with the father or offer the father meaningful assistance in completing any of the tasks required by the performance
agreement." 13 In fact, it was unrefuted that the father's correspondence
to HRS about his son and the case went unanswered. 1 4 The court also
rejected a claim of abandonment as grounds for termination, finding that the
relationship between the father and the natural grandparents with whom the
'
child resided "was strained at best. 215
The father wrote to the child and
only stopped correspondence because he received no return correspondence
from the grandparents. Additionally, they would not accept his collect calls.
The order of termination was reversed and the case was remanded to
provide time to the father to substantially comply with the performance
agreement.1 6
D. Government Agency Tort Liability
In a significant decision rendered in the summer of 1995, the Supreme
Court of Florida was asked to decide the question of whether an adjudicated
dependent juvenile may maintain an ordinary negligence claim against HRS
for the latter's alleged failure to provide the juvenile with services. In

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

SOLER, supra note 206, at 4-118.
647 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 1026.
Id. at 1026-27.
Id. at 1027.
Id.
G.R.S., 647 So. 2d at 1027.

Id.
Id. at 1028.
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Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. B.J.M.,217 the Supreme Court of Florida, in an opinion by Justice Anstead, answered the
certified question in the negative. The case began when an adjudicated
dependent and delinquent minor, through its guardian ad litem, Legal
Services of Greater Miami, filed a mandamus action against HRS seeking
to compel the agency to place the child in a specific rehabilitative program.
Subsequently, the child amended his complaint to include a tort claim for
general damages based on negligence. Specifically, the child claimed that
HRS breached its duty to the child by not following recommended
psychiatric placement reports, failing to provide proper counsel, failing to
provide vocational training or educational services comparable to those
provided in non-residential settings, failing to generally meet the child's
emotional, developmental and placement needs, and by inappropriately
labeling the child. In response, HRS moved for summary judgment. The
trial court granted the motion. The Third District Court of Appeal reversed
and certified the question to the supreme court.218
After disposing of several procedural issues, including collateral
estoppel, the supreme court addressed the question of sovereign immunity.2 9 The court surveyed the historical analysis of sovereign immunity by
the Florida courts. It held that the parameters of governmental tort liability
are premised upon finding governmental activity in one of four categories:
1) legislative, permitting, licensing and executive officer functions; 2)
enforcement of laws and the protection of public safety; 3) capital improvement and property control operations; and 4) professional, educational, and
general services for the health and welfare of the citizens.2 2 ° The court
explained that assuming a government action or function is not protected
under the first two categories, the court must determine whether conduct
within categories three or four amounts to a "'discretionary planning or
judgmental function"' as opposed to conduct which is purely operational.22' If the challenged action is policy making, planning, or judgmental
activity, it is immune from tort liability. In other words, the question is
whether the function is policy making, planning, or judgmental as opposed
to routine operational level actions that are subject to tort liability. The
22
court cited Department of Health and Rehabilitative Services v. Whaley

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

656 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 1995).
Id. at 909.
Id.
Id. at 911.
Id. at 912.
574 So. 2d 100 (Fla. 1991).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol20/iss1/6

26

Dale: Juvenile Law

1995]

Dale

for the proposition that operational level decisions expose a child to a
specific danger, such as physical placement of a child in a specific room in
an HRS detention center known to HRS to be occupied by dangerous
juveniles. ' The court also cited Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services v. Yamuni,224 to address the danger of negligently failing to
adequately protect the child from further physical abuse at the operational
Relying upon cases rejecting theories of educational neglect, the
level.'
court held that both placement decisions and decisions as to the provisions
of services are planning level activities and not operational ones.226 Thus,
the court concluded that decisions on how to properly plan for a dependent
child or rehabilitate a delinquent juvenile and to assess the need for
counseling, education, and vocational training are discretionary judgmental
decisions to be made pursuant to the broad discretion vested in HRS by the
legislature. 7 For these actions HRS is immune. •
Finally, the court held that its conclusion that the failure to provide
certain services to the child was shielded by sovereign immunity, was also
supported by Florida Statutes § 39.455V2 That statute immunizes social
workers who are carrying out a placement plan for dependent children. The
court noted that the law does create a duty on the part of HRS and its agents
and employees not to act with wanton or willful disregard of the interest of
the child. Thus, a claim based on willful and wanton conduct is actionable.229 B.J.M. therefore holds that immunity protects HRS from tort
liability for judgmental decisions relating to the care of dependent and
delinquent children. HRS may only be sued for operational level acts of
negligence.
E. Legislation
This year the legislature expanded HRS's duty to report certain findings
to law enforcement during child abuse and neglect investigations, including
when HRS is aware that the family is likely to flee and when the immediate
safety or welfare of the child is in danger.2 " HRS must now make an

223. B.J.M., 656 So.
224. 529 So. 2d 258
225. B.J.M., 656 So.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 916.
228. IM at 917.
229. Id.
230. See ch. 95-228,
at FLA. STAT. § 415.505).
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immediate report to law enforcement agencies, whereas previously, the
agency had up to three days before transmitting the report to law enforcement.23 Also, the law which mandated certain persons with defined legal
duties to report abuse or neglect to HRS now extends to reporting an
abandoned child. 32
Previously, HRS could only take away an alleged dependant child upon
reasonable grounds that the child was abused, neglected, abandoned,
suffering from an injury, or in immediate danger.233 The legislature has
eased this burden. Now, HRS can justify taking an alleged dependant child
merely upon probable cause to support a finding of reasonable grounds for
the child's removal. 34 Further, the grounds for child removal now include
a lack of immediate adult supervision or care, in addition to the situation
where the child's custodian materially violates a condition of court imposed
placement (if the child was court placed).235 Once the child is taken into
custody by HRS, an emergency shelter hearing must take place within
twenty-four hours of the child's removal.236 During the pendency of that
hearing, relatives of the child will have priority consideration over custody
of the child as opposed to nonrelative placement.237
In adjudicatory hearings, the court must now possess independent
corroborative evidence of the dependency when the proceeding is based
solely on an anonymous report.238 In the past, courts, on the basis of stare
decisis, protected indigent parents or guardians of the child by requiring
counsel for them during a dependency action when the dependency could
form the basis for a subsequent termination of parental rights.2 39 Florida
law has been amended to comply with the prior case law and mandates that
indigent parents be appointed counsel in dependency actions when threa-

231. Id.
232. See id. § 44, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1611-12 (amending FLA. STAT. §
415.504).
233. See FLA. STAT. § 39.401.
234. Ch. 95-228, § 6, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1561-62 (amending FLA. STAT. §
39.401(1), (6)); see also id. § 7, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1562-64 (to be codified at FLA.
STAT. § 39.402).
235. Id. § 6, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1561-62 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
39.401(b) (1993)).
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Ch. 95-228, § 12, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1568 (to be codified at FLA. STAT.
§ 39.408).
239. In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1980); In re D.F., 622 So. 2d 1102 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1993); FLA. R. Juv. P. 8.320.
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tened with permanent loss of the child or when criminal charges underlie the
dependency petition. 24°
The legislature has expressed its intent to encourage relatives to care
for a child who is taken into foster care custody. 4 Further, the legislature
expressed its preference that adoptive placements take place as expeditiously
as possible after a termination of parental rights in order to avoid temporary
Long-term foster care placements are not generally
placements. 42
considered a permanent option, but may be considered a permanent option
when all the following conditions are met: the child is fourteen years or
older; the child lives in a licensed foster home and the foster parents and
child desire to live together on a permanent basis but do not wish to adopt;
the foster parents are committed to providing care to the child until age of
majority; the child has lived with foster parents for at least twelve months;
the foster parents and child view each other as family; and the child's
well-being is being promoted by the living arrangements.243 Long-term
placements, however, are not permanent, and are subject to court revocation
when a material change in circumstances exists, which makes it no longer
in the child's best interest to remain in the particular foster home.2 "

IV. FAMILIES IN NEED OF SERVICES AND CHILDREN IN NEED OF
SERVICES
As prior surveys have indicated, there is very little case law interpreting
the part of the 1987 juvenile code covering families and children in need of
services.245 However, one aspect of the Families in Need of Services and
Children in Need of Services ("FINS/CINS") statute that has generated
discussion is the proposition that a child who violates a CINS order may be
held in contempt of court and then have his or her liberty removed by
placement in secure detention.246 The ability of the court to punish a

240. Ch. 95-228, § 5, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1561 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.40
(1993)).
241. See id. § 13, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1568-69 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.45
(Supp. 1994)).
242. Id. § 14, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1569 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.47 (Supp.
1994)).
243. Id. § 62, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1635 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
39.41(2)(a)6.c.(I)-(V)).
244. Id. § 62, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1635 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
39.41 (2)(a)6.d.).
245. See 1992 Survey, supra note 1, at 383-84.
246. FLA. STAT. § 39.444 (Supp. 1994).
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status offender by use of secure detention is not just an issue in Florida.
The Federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act also provides
for the enforcement of valid court orders in status offender cases by
contempt and punishment and ultimately incarceration. 47
Indeed, the issue of punishment of children for violation of CINS
orders was recently before the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Department
of Juvenile Justice v. S. W.2 48 The Department of Juvenile Justice filed a
petition for certiorari on behalf of two children who had been adjudicated
children in need of supervision and who were ordered by the trial court to
complete certain educational requirements, although the appellate court
noted that the record was quite unclear on exactly what was ordered. 49
Four months after the initial order, the trial court issued an "Order to Show
Just Cause" to the two children to show why they should not be held in
indirect criminal contempt for failure to comply with the court's school
orders.
The children appeared, waived counsel, and pled guilty to
contempt of court. They were adjudicated delinquent, placed in non-secure
detention and, after a disposition hearing, placed at restrictiveness level two,
and ordered
to pay costs, restitution, and comply with other special
provisions. z5 All of this was done in clear contravention of the Supreme
255

Court of Florida's 1992 opinion in A.A. v. Rolle,5 2 which held that the
court may not adjudicate children delinquent and in contempt for violation
of the CINS order and place them in detention as punishment. The S.W.
court recognized this and granted the petition for certiorari.253 In fact,
current Florida law now provides for the secure detention for direct or
indirect criminal contempt for violation of the CINS order.25
The
legislature responded to the A.A. decision by amending the juvenile code to
allow for secure detention of CINS for five to fifteen days in a staff secure
255
shelter or residential facility.
Some minor statutory changes were made by the legislature concerning
status offenses. Students expelled from school are not guaranteed continu-

247. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5785 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
248. 647 So. 2d 1055 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
249. Id. at 1056 n.1.
250. Id. at 1056.

251. Id.
252.
253.
254.
255.

604 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1992).
S.W., 647 So. 2d at 1056.
See FLA. STAT. § 39.0145 (1993).
Id. § 39.0145(2)(b).
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ing educational services 2 5 6 Nonetheless, district school systems may set
up alternative site schools for disruptive or violent youths. 57 The alternative site schools are generally referred to as second chance schools.25
Students assigned to second chance schools must either be: habitually
disruptive, interfere with their own or other's learning, or commit a serious
offense which would normally warrant suspension or expulsion.2 5 9 If one
of these criteria exists, the school's local child study team will evaluate the
child to determine if placement into the second chance school is necessry.26 The school boards should take into account the student's safety,
the school's ability to control the student, the appropriate educational
program in which to place the student, and how to maintain an educational
learning environment.26 1
V. CONCLUSION
The legislature had taken a hiatus from its prior efforts to respond to
public pressure involving the juvenile justice and child welfare systems.
The appellate courts have been diligent in hearing significant trial issues and
holding the trial courts accountable for compliance with the juvenile code.
It would be desirable for the legislature to allow the current juvenile code
to remain in effect so that all participants in the juvenile justice and child
welfare system have an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the law
and employ it over time. It is hard to evaluate the effectiveness of the
juvenile code when the legislature changes it in response to every change in
the political wind.

256. Ch. 95-267, § 63, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1877 (amending FLA. STAT. §
228.041 (Supp. 1994)).
257. See id. § 64, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1877-78 (amending FLA. STAT. §
230.02 (1993)).
258. See id. § 67, 1995 Fa. Sess. Law Serv. at 1880-81 (to be codified at FLA.
STAT. § 230.2316).
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See ch. 95-267, § 65, 1995 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. at 1878 (to be codified at FLA.
STAT. § 230.22).
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